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LEGAL STATUS OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVORCES
By VimN D. CALLoWAY, JR.*
L Introduction
In recent months it has become increasingly popular among
United States citizens seeking divorces to forsake the time-honored
trek to Reno, and head instead for the outlying territory of the
Virgin Islands. This change in direction of the so called "divorce
trade" is due to the comparative ease with which one can obtain a
divorce decree and the attractions of the Islands. For those who
can afford the trip, it is thought that two birds can be killed with
one stone, so to speak: a divorce obtained and a restful vacation
enjoyed.
By provision of Congress, the Legislative Assembly of the Virgin
Islands was set up to enact legislation applicable to the Virgin
Islands as a whole,' the District Court of the Virgin Islands being
given jurisdiction of all cases of divorce and annulment of mar-
riage.2
The current divorce law was enacted by the eighth Legislative
Assembly of the Virgin Islands on December 18, 1944; approved
December 29, 1944, by the acting Governor; and went into effect on
January 28, 1945. The law gives as grounds3 for either party to
obtain a legal separation, or to have their marriage contract dis-
solved, at the plantiff's option, for: adultery, cruelty, impotency,
desertion for one year, habitual drunkenness for one year, convic-
tion of a felony, insanity, and incompatibility of temperament.4
If the marriage was not celebrated in the district of the suit,
before commencing action, the plaintiff must have been an inhabi-
tant for a six-week period; such period being declared "Sufficient
to give the court jurisdiction without regard to the place where the
marriage was performed or the cause of action arose."'5 When the
dissolution judgment has become final, and after the expiration of
* 2nd year law student, Duke University; A.B. 1951, Duke University.
148 U. S. C. A. § 1405f. 2 48 U. S. C. A. § 1406 (4).
'DivoRcE LAWS OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, LAWS 1944, Bill No. 14 § 9'
GORDON IRELAND & JESUS Dn GALINDEZ, DIVORCE IN THE AMERIcAs, pp. 32-34
(1947); 39 KY. L. J. 289-316 (1951).
' Emphasis supplied.
IRE5AND & GALINDEz, op. cit., supra note 3.
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time for appeal, either spouse may remarry again without further
limitation of time.6
With the leniency 7 of the divorce law in effect, plus the tourist
attraction of the locale, it is little wonder that prosperous United
States citizens with the intent to sever marital relations are taking
advantage of the new divorce mecca. The advantage of a divorce
from a United States Federal court over the "quickies" from
Mexico5 in contrast to the Nevada divorce-mill towns, and for East-
erners, at least, the shorter distance-all add to the attractiveness
of transacting such business in the tropic Islands. In fact, the
short residence requirement coupled with the liberal i'compatibility
cause looks suspiciously like a deliberate tourist-trade bid.'
Although there are no reported Supreme Court decisions as of
April 1953, under the present doctrine of the United States Su-
preme Court there is considerable doubt that a state court, or pre-
sumably any foreign court, would be precluded from collaterally
attacking the finality of the decision of the jurisdiction giving the
finding of domicil.10 Here then we come upon the problem. As the
law now stands, what would happen to a Virgin Islands divorce
decree if attacked by a suit in another state or territory?
0 Ibid.
7 The length of time of residency required in the different jurisdictions
seems to run between six weeks and five years, with the majority being one year.
2 VEitrwi, AmERICAi FAm L LAWS, Table XLII, Divorce and Separation,
(1932).
As to grounds, New Mexico has a ground of "Incompatibility." N. iE.
STAT. ANN., § 25-701(8). Alaska has ground of "Incompatibility of tempera-
ment. "1 3 ALAsxA ComrP. LA WS ANN., 1949, § 56-5-7 (5). Florida statute reads:
"Habitual indulgence by defendant in violent and ungovernable temper." 5
FLA. STAT. ANN-. § 65.04(5). Arkansas also has a liberal ground, "Where
either party willfully deserts and absents himself from the other for one year
without reasonable cause." 3 ARK. STAT. AmN. § 34-1202.
8 It has been held that Mexican "mail order" divorces give no color of
jurisdiction to the Mexican courts to grant divorce. The leading case holding
such divorces to be nullities was Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146, 81 N. E.
2d 60 (1948). It was said in that ease that the Constitution requiring states
to give full faith and credit to judgments of sister states had no relation to
foreign nation decrees. See also, Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N. J. 531, 61 A. 2d 436
(1949).
0 However, the case of Burch v. Burch, 195 F. 2d 799 (3rd Cir. 1952), states
that the incompatibility cause probably was taken over from the existing Danish
Law at the time the Islands were purchased from Denmark by the United
States.
10 11 1 [I]nhabitant' and 'resident' as used in the [Virgin Islands] statute
must be taken to mean cdomiciliary' and 'domicil' respectively." Burch v.
Burch, id. at 804.
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"According to the usual Anglo-American rule, marriage
is a status, a sufficiently permanent relation between the
spouses that it has a 'real' existence, and can be treated ...
as if it were a thing or res .... [Marriage] is the legal posi-
tion of the married person in the place in which he ... has a
permanent home. Thus, under this 'status theory,' the power
of the courts to destroy ... the relationship is based on the
domicil of the spouses.""'
The difficulties, we find, crop up and compound when spouses take
up residence in different jurisdictions.
Due to the lack of any uniformity in the divorce laws of the
various states and territories of the United States, the only forces
that have been applied for the recognition of divorces in one state
by another are comity and the "Full faith and credit clause" of
the Federal Constitution.'2 This clause provides that "Full faith
and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other state.' '"s This clause was
implemented by act of Congress in 1789, which provided that
properly authenticated records of judicial proceedings in one state
shall have such faith and credit as they have by law or usage in
courts of the state from which they are taken.' 4
Where both parties are domiciled in the jurisdiction of the
forum, or where the defendant appears personally in an action
brought by the plaintiff in his domicil, decrees have been accorded
full faith and credit.'5  The difficulty, and our problem, arises
where the plaintiff takes up residence in the Islands, brings action
there, claiming it to be his domicil (although it is not the last bona
fide marital domicil), the defendant domiciled elsewhere'0 being
1122 So. CAxir. L. R a. 155, 155 (1949). Also see 1953 WASH. U. L. Q.
98.
22 Although comity depends on the states themselves, the Virgin Islands are
a territory of the United States and necessarily are under the Constitution, the
full faith and credit clause applying the same as to any other state or pos-
session.
23 U. S. CoxsT., ART. IV § 1.
1 Present code section: 28 U. S. C. A. § 1738, reads: "Such acts, records
and judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken."
Ir Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343
(1948).
16 American courts from early times departed from the English rule to the
contrary, and held that a wife could have a separate domicil. Modern legisla-
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served only constructively by publication or otherwise, though by
methods satisfying due process.' 7 We are dealing not with the
purely domestic, semi-domestic, or wholly foreign divorce,18 but
with the semi-foreign, where the plaintiff sues in other than the
matrimonial domicil or regular home living place and the defendant
remains in some other state or territory.' 9 There is no question that
Virgin Islands divorces would be recognized in the various states
when granted in cases where both spouses were resident with bona
fide domicils in the Islands; and little doubt that full faith and
credit would be granted or comity extended in cases where the
plaintiff was a bona fide long term inhabitant of the Islands but
defendant had removed from the Islands.20 Wholly foreign di-
vorces are not granted.2 '
II. Historical Background, Pre-Williams Cases
The matrimonial domicil rule was early seen in Chesley v. GlafJ-
ton,22 where husband and wife married and lived in West Virginia,
H moved to Colorado, W refused to move, H subsequently obtained
a divorce in Colorado and the divorce was held invalid in Kentucky.
Dictum from the case, however, suggested that the decree would
have been valid if the formalities of service had been properly com-
plied with.
This tentative rule flowered in the case of Atherton v.Atherton,2 3
where H and W married and lived together in Kentucky, W moved
to New York and H got a Kentucky divorce. The decree was held
tion has done much to raise the legal rights of the wife to an equal plane with
the husband. 31 IOWA L. REv. 232 (1946). 9" The rule is that she [wife] may
acquire separate domicil whenever it is necessary and proper that she should
do so ... the proceeding for divorce may be initiated where the wife has her
domicil." Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall 108, 124 (U. S. 1870). Also see, Beu v.
Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901); Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619 (1914).
17 22 So. CAmre. L. REv. 155 (1949).
8 Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901).
20 19 TEN. L. REv. 78 (1945).
20 Since the domicil of the plaintiff would be unquestionable. See Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
-2119... judicial power to grant a divorce is founded on domicil.... [T]he
domicil of at least one of the spouses must be within the state or territory in
order to give courts of that state or territory power to dissolve the marriage."
Burch v. Burch, 195 F. 2d 799, 804 (3rd Cir. 1952). See also, Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562
(1906).
2 110 U. S. 701 (1884).
23 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
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valid in New York and a bar to W's New York petition. Reasonable
steps had been taken to notify W, failing that, constructive service
was had on W in Kentucky. The decision inferred that the fault
was attributable to the deserting wife; therefore, the "matrimonial
domicil" remained within Kentucky, the only situs of the marriage,
and the plaintiff's domicil.
Haddock v. Haddock24 was the leading case from its decision in
1906 until the 1940's. This case extended the matrimonial domicil
rule. The New York courts had refused to recognize and extend
full faith and credit to a Connecticut divorce obtained by H who
had moved from New York to Connecticut and established a long
term bona fide domicil. The Supreme Court upheld this position
holding that Connecticut was not the matrimonial domicil, and
there was neither personal service on, nor appearance by the wife
in the Connecticut proceedings. Therefore, the Connecticut divorce
was not entitled to be granted full faith and credit by New York,
even though H's bona fide domicil was in Connecticut. The matri-
monial domicil had remained with the wife because H was the
wrongful party. This decision all but knocked out one of the main
props of semi-foreign divorces.
The case of Mler v. Miller25 implies that perhaps a number of
jurisdictions did not avail themselves of the Haddock ruling. In
that case, the Iowa court, following a policy of extending comity to
decrees of divorce from foreign states, said that if a decree was
"good on its face, a presumption of validity [arises], and burden of
attack is on him who denies the same." 2
5
a
III. The Williams Cases
The long-standing tenure of the Haddock case doctrine was ex-
pressly overruled by the first Williams case.26 In this case a man
and woman were charged with bigamous cohabitation in North
Carolina after having obtained divorces from their respective pre-
vious spouses in the state of Nevada. The North Carolina Supreme
Court had upheld the lower court conviction. 27 The United States
Supreme Court held that the establishment of a bona fide domicil
in Nevada, not having been challenged by the North Carolina Court,
1! 201 U. S. 562 (1906) ; discussed in 54 YALz L. J. 806 (1945).
25 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N. W. 262 (1925).
-"Id. 206 N. W. at 265.
20 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
27 Williams v. North Carolina, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. 2d 769 (1941).
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the court of the latter state is bound by, and must recognize and
show respect to, the Nevada decree. This was true although juris-
diction over the respondents had been obtained by substituted serv-
ice, and the recognition of such divorces offended North Carolina
policy.
So the first Williams case restored the constructive service prop
to foreign-divorce, holding that if the suing party, man or woman,
is domiciled in the granting state, service by publication on the non-
resident spouse is sufficient service. "The rule was now unmistak-
able that a foreign divorce grounded upon constructive service...
was entitled to full faith and credit in all states." 2 8  Matrimonial
domicil paled in importance, but the question of bona fide domicil
of the plaintiff was left open.
The Supreme Court of the United'States remanded the case to
the North Carolina Supreme Court which vacated the former judg-
ment and ordered a new trial.29 After the new trial and conviction
the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed"° and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.3 1 This time the record presented
the precise question whether North Carolina had the right to refuse
full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary
to findings of the Nevada court, the North Carolina jury had found
no bona fide domicil was acquired in Nevada. The Supreme Court
affirmed the North Carolina position, holding that North Carolina
was entitled to find that petitioners did not acquire domicil in
Nevada, and that the Nevada court was, therefore, without power
to liberate the petitioners from amenability to the laws of North
Carolina governing domestic relations.
In the second Williams case, the trial jury found that the de-
fendants went to Nevada with the intent to get divorces and then to
return immediately to North Carolina. The Supreme Court said
that the judicial power to grant divorce jurisdiction was founded
on domicil, a state having the authority to ascertain the existence
of that crucial fact.
"As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domi-
cil, upon which depends the power to exert judicial author-
ity, a State not a party to the exertion of such judicial
authority in another State but seriously affected by it has a
28 19 TENN. L. R iv. 78, 81 (1945).
222 N. 0. 609, 24 S. E. 2d 256 (1943).
30 224 N. 0. 183, 29 S. B. 2. 744 (1944).
"Williams v. North Carolina [I], 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
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right, when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to
ascertain the truth or existence of that crucial fact."832
"But simply because the Nevada Court found that it had
power to award a divorce decree cannot . . . foreclose re-
examination by another state."83
The North Carolina Supreme Court had said that the jury was
instructed that if the defendants went to Nevada with the requisite
intent and actually acquired domicil there, though they later
changed their minds and returned to North Carolina, then the
courts of Nevada would have acquired valid jurisdiction and the
decrees would have been entitled to full faith and credit.84
Williams (II) did not expressly overrule Williams (I), the court
being careful to distinguish them. The Supreme Court did not
return to the old concept of "marital domicil" but created two new
expressions: "domiciliary origin" and "old domiciliary states."
The result appears that the finding of domicil is a fact and such
finding by one state's court is not binding on another's; all that is
needed to disregard it being some evidence that the jury may rea-
sonably conclude that there was no domiciliary intent when the
decree was rendered. The Supreme Court seemed to leave the prob-
lem hanging on the rather vague term "domicil" and the finding
of "jurisdictional fact.''35
The doctrine seems to emerge that foreign divorce grounded on
constructive service plus bona fide domicil8" of the plaintiff must be
recognized when based on the constitutional mandate of full faith
and credit. But the states are left free to make inquiry as to
whether the granting state had lacked proper jurisdiction. Since
the granting state found bona fide domicil, the refusal of another
to recognize the divorce is subject to review by the United States
Supreme Court. 7
IV. Post-Williams Cases
As early as 1808, in Rose v. Hmely,88 it was said that the full
"Id. at 230. " Id. at 234.
"The Supreme Court cited Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938) as the basis
for its decision in the second Williams case.
"31 IOwA L. REv. 237 (1946) ; and 21 N. Y. U. L. Q. 457 (1946). For fur-
ther treatments of the second Willians case see: 25 So. CAiar. I. REV. 318
(1952); 19 Timpnm I. Q. (1945); 29 A. B. A. J. 268 (1943).
" The second Williams case held that the wrong or fault of the person
establishing domicil is immaterial to the jurisdiction.
"6 LA. L. Rzv. 469 (1945).
"4 Cranch 241, 269 (U. S. 1808), aff I in Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall.
457, 462 (U. S. 1873); and Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 573 (1906).
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faith and credit clause did not extend to judgments granted by
courts lacking the proper jurisdiction; and Williams (II) added
that domicil, like other jurisdictional facts was open to inspection
by a second state. This seems consistent with the principle of Con-
flict of Laws that judgments rendered without jurisdiction need
not be accorded recognition by sister states, and that the second
state may decide whether the first had jurisdiction to render judg-
ment.39 Esenwein v. Esenwein,40 although the main issue involved
was whether H's divorce would cancel a prior support decree in
favor of W awarded by the Pennsylvania court, upheld the right of
Pennsylvania to find that a Navada divorce decree lacked the juris-
dictional prerequisite of bona fide domicil.41
Davis v. Davis,42 decided a few years prior to the two Williams
decisions, had held that a wife who entered a personal appearance
in H's Virginia divorce proceeding and contested his alleged domicil
there was bound by the Virginia court's findings of jurisdiction,
and could not collaterally attack them in the District of Columbia.43
In 1948 Sherrer v. Sherrer44 strengthened the Davis decision.
The Supreme Court held that, where H appeared personally in W's
Florida divorce proceedings, and did not litigate the court's juris-
diction specifically, when he later sought a Massachusetts declara-
tion placing in issue the validity of his wife's domicil at the time,
the full faith and credit clause requirement barred his collateral
attack on jurisdictional grounds. He had participated in the liti-
gation and had, in effect, his day in court. The issue, under the
circumstances, was no longer open.45
The Sherrer decision was strengthened by Coe v. Coe.46 The
11 Thompson v. Whitman, ibid.; Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 31.
,0 325 U. S. 279 (1945).
' Huggs v. Huggs, 195 F. 2d 771 (D. C. Cir. 1952) ; and Hobbs v. Hobbs,
197 F. 2d 412 (D. 0. Cir. 1952), are two recent Court of Appeals cases from
the District of Columbia holding that divorce decrees not entitled to full faith
and credit due to plaintiffs -intention to return to the District of Columbia
after acquiring a divorce.
-- See note 15, supra.
"Jurisdiction to grant divorce exists in any state in which at least one of
the parties is domiciled. RESTATFET, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), §5 110, 111,
113; ESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1948 Supp.), § 33, Comment a; GOODRICH,
CONFLCT or LAws (3rd ed. 1949), §397, p. 127; 27 C. J. S., Divorce, § 633,
p. 71.
"See note 15, supra.
"1 25 So. CALIF. L. L-v. 318-329 (1952) ; Baer, The Aftermath of Williams
vs. North Carolina, 28 N. C. L. REv. 265-290 (1950).
10 334 U. S. 378 (1948).
110 DuxE BAn JouRNA
Sherrer and Coe cases rendered immunity to easy divorces from
attack by spouses who appeared in the litigation.
"[But although not assailable] as between parties that
does not necessarily mean the home state cannot prosecute
for bigamy should one of the .. . [parties remarry] and
come back to live in the state of his true domicil."' 7
Thus we see that the Supreme Court makes the divorce uncertainty
worse by recognizing divisible-divorce. On the basis of Estin v.
Estin" and Kreiger v. Kreiger,9 we see the court saying that re-
gardless of the laws of the divorcing state, if under the law of the
home state an ex parte decree does not terminate a prior support
order, that order remains in effect despite foreign divorce. Thus,
we see the Supreme Court saying that one can have a divorce recog-
nized for some purposes and not for others.
In Johnson v. Mtuelberger,50 where a Florida divorce was at-
tacked by the parties' daughter in New York, the court held that
when, as in the Sherrer case, the defendant spouse appears in
the divorce action, or is personally served, the (Florida) court's
finding of jurisdiction may not be collaterally attacked in another
state by anyone, if it is not subject to such attack in the divorcing
state. In Cook v. Cook5 this position was strengthened, the court
stating that "until Florida's jurisdiction is shown to be vulnerable,
Vermont may not relitigate the issue of domicil upon which the
Florida decree rests." Sutton v. Lieb52 held that where W was not
personally served and did not enter appearance in a Nevada divorce
suit, the divorce decree was subject to attack and nullification by the
New York court for lack of jurisdiction over the parties, and the
New York decree invalidating the Nevada divorce, entered in TV's
separate maintenance proceeding in New York, was entitled to full
faith and credit in Nevada as well as Illinois where the instant suit
was brought. But "Illinois is free to decide ... the effect of New
York's declaration of annulment on the obligations of the respond-
ent, a stranger to that decree.' 252a
V. Application to the Virgin Islands Decrees
Examining our Virgin Islands divorce decrees in the light of
these cases and the present Supreme Court standing as set forth in
-, 28 N. 0. L. Rl v. 265, 281 (1950).
,8 334 U. S. 541 (1948). - 334 U. S. 555 (1948).
80340 U. S. 581 (1951). '342 U. S. 126 (1951).
8 342 U. S. 402 (1952). r2a Id. at 410.
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the Williams cases and following, the picture is not bright and clear
as it may seem at first blush. The holder of such a decree could be
sure of the fact that as long as he remained in the Virgin Islands
-with the apparent intent to remain indefinitely he would be free of
his former spouse. If he returns to his former home and his divorce
should there be contested, even years later, by his former spouse,
the state court in that state may 'find that there was no requisite
domiciliary intent and refuse to recognize the divorce.
The most recent and apparently the only case involving a Virgin
Islands divorce was Burck v. Burch, a Circuit Court case5 3 which
construed the Virgin Islands statute.54 The court said:
"Jurisdiction to decree a divorce is not conferred upon
the [District] court [of the Virgin Islands] by mere tem-
porary residence of the plaintiff in the district which is ac-
companied by present intention on the part of the plaintiff
to leave the Islands as soon as the divorce is granted. '55
The court went on to hold that the plaintiff had satisfied the require-
ment of domicil, as he had lived and and worked in the Virgin Is-
lands for nine or ten months and was presently employed there
with the intent to remain. The court construed the incompatibility
of temperament to refer "to conflicts in personalities and disposi-
tions so deep as to be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for
parties to continue a normal marital relationship with each other.' "5
The court said that the ground did not include petty bickering and
quarrels. The facts of the case, however, show that the defendant-
wife brought a counterclaim; therefore, this particular case would
be foreclosed from later attack by the Davis decision, and a state
court would be very hard put to find that the plaintiff did not have
a bona fide Virgin Islands domicil. Therefore, this case does not
offer a ready solution to our problem.
Most people currently combining divorce and diversion in the
03 195 F. 2d 799 (3rd Cir. 1952). "Courts of Appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of . . . the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28
U. S. C. A. § 1291.
DIVORcE LAW 0r THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, LAws 1944, Bill No. 14, § 9.
U 195 F. 2d 799, 805 (3rd Cir. 1952). See also, Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp.
987 (D. C. D. C. 1950), which held that if the plaintiff is to establish a domicil
so as to give the court jurisdiction for the purpose of divorce, there must be at
least no intention of plaintiff to live elsewhere, and no intention to leave as
soon as the divorce can be obtained.
- 195 F. 2d 799, 807 (3rd Cir. 1952).
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southern clime do not intend to live there beyond the time it will
take them to procure a divorce. Evidence of a round-trip ticket
purchased before they left home might be enough to invalidate their
divorces on their return home. Rice v. Rice5 7 held, in an action
for declaratory judgment, that divorce in Nevada did not dissolve
marriage in Connecticut, and evidence of a request for leave and a
request for extension of that leave from the plaintiff's government
job supported a finding that the plaintiff did not have a Nevada
domicil and the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction. Moritz v. Moritz5
held that the plaintiff could not qualify as a legal voter of New
York and sue for divorce in the District of Columbia as a resident
at the same time. Thus it would seem that about the only sure way
to be secure in one's divorce would be actually to intend to stay
when one went down to the Islands and be able to prove domicil.50
This alternative hardly would be satisfactory for most divorce
seekers. The conclusion unhappily seems to be that unless and until
the Supreme Court changes its present policy by deciding on a rea-
sonable requirement to meet due process and grant full faith and
credit, and substitute that for domicil, or a Uniform Divorce Law is
created,60 those with Virgin Islands divorces will be subject to the
perils of shaky and uncertain marital status.
.7 336 U. S. 674 (1949).
r8 80 F. Supp. 267 (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1936).
59 Domicil is, "That place in which a man has voluntarily fixed the habita-
tion of himself and family, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but
with the present intention of making a permanent home, for an unlimited or
indefinite period." BEAcxs LAW DIOTioNARY, 3rd Ed., p. 608.
60 There has been marked lack of support by the states in this movement.
For a treatment of the history see, 1952 WASH. U. L. Q. 98.
